The Secret War In Korea, June 1950 - June 1952

Date published: 17 July 1968

Copy No. 2 of 3

Controlled by . FE Division
Date prepared : March 1964
Written by ; .

CLANDESTINE SERVICES

HISTORY

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUL 2007

CS Historical
No. . 52

DO NOT DESTROY

(TITLE OF PAPER)

THE SECRET WAR IN KOREA

(PERIOD)

Tune 1950 to June 1952

SECRET

access to North Korea in the last year of the war.

Air Operations

For the first ten months of the war, CIA used U.S. Far
East Air Force (FEAF) aircraft to drop agents and materiel
into North Korea. CIA first began dropping agents in the
twelfth week of the war. A detachment of the 21st Troop
Carrier Squadron eventually redesignated as Flight "B" of
the Fifth Air Force provided most of the support. FEAF also
provided photo intelligence support to Agency operations.

U.S. Army unconventional warfare air operations began
when an airborne ranger first lieutenant with the Theater
Intelligence Liaison Group in Korea asked an Air Force captain
to drop some G-2 (Army Intelligence) agents into North Korea.
That flight was the genesis of Flight "B M which made hundreds
of C-47 night flights over North Korea in the first two years
of the war. Despite frequent adverse weather condi tons and
fog in the valleys, there were a minimum of abortive flights.
The Flight "B" aircrews always did a. fine job and with no
loss of aircraft. One pilot made more th^lf 108 night flights
over North Korea, dropping agents, propaganda leaflets, and
supplies.

When the enemy retaliated against CIA guerrillas in the
winter of 1951-1952, drop zones and drop times had to be laid
on and changed on short notice. Simultaneously the Air Force

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N^E^

increased its air support to the more vital conventional
warfare making aircraft difficult to get. A civilian
Cessna and a Beechcraft C-45 were obtained by the Agency.

Two of the best pilots were transferred to CIA from
Flight "B". Cargo aircraft from a CIA-controlled civilian
airline were used to support the guerrilla forces. The
U.S. Air Force-CIA relationship throughout the war was
particularly profitable, close, and cordial.

Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) Guerrillas

In early 1951, CIA and the G-3 Eighth United States
Army Korea (EUSAK), working in harmony, divided North Korea
into two parts for guerrilla warfare action and control.

The Agency already had established the nucleus for a

i

trained guerrilla movement in the mountains in the extreme
northeaslj. The Army took the western portion where a
spontaneous pro-U.N. guerrilla movement developed after the
U.N. offensive crossed the 38th parallel on 7 October 1950.

By October 1951 the G-3 EUSAK program had about 8,000 guerrillas
on the west coast above the 38th parallel organized into
sixteen units of varying capabilities depending on how they
were recruited and their state of training. However, no
safe bases were established on the flat, muddy mainland
estuaries and indentations as the effort was dependent upon
island bases lying off the west coast, protected by the

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s

U.S. Navy which controlled the sea. This failure to establish
secure bases on the coastal mainland was disastrous. During
the Panmunjom Truce Talks in the winter of 1951-1952, the
Communists mopped up the area. CIA advisors worked

with the EUSAK west coast guerrillas from January to April
1952. Competition between the CIA and Army guerrilla warfare
efforts was keen but wholesome, with no real problems at the
operating level. The over-all CIA/ Army relationship at that
level was eminently satisfactory and mutually advantageous.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE (FI)

In the early stages of the war, there was confusion in
the field of intelligence collection. Military units were
not prepared for the Communist invasion and, consequently,
had no plans for collecting tactical intelligence in the
event of war. Budgets had been slashed, and trained personnel
were not available. General Willoughby, G-2 of the Far East
Command, asked CIA to step into this tactical intelligence

gap from which there was no pulling out until the war was

<****-'

terminated. v

An Early Air Infiltration

One of the first missions assigned to the Agency was the
placement of teams in H ^separate areas along the

placement of teams in H [separate areas along the

northern border of North Korea. The objectives were to

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M

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c

establish observation posts in mountainous areas overlooking
railroad lines, ports, and major highways used by the North
Korean Army, and to give early earning of support by Chinese

Communists or Soviets. Alter ten weeks ol training | ]

were dropped close to their target areas Irom a Far East Air

Force B-17. | 1 of the Q^teams came on the air with their

radios, but within lour days reported that they were detected
O. Of the I ‘ dropped over a period

and on the run. Of the

of ten months,

1 were returned to CIA after working

their way back to 0.8; Army or 0.8. Marine Divisions. The

operation demonstrated that properly motivated and trained

Korean agents could survive in the North and produce results
ii they could be put in place without being detected.

Support to Inchon Landings

in early August 1950 at the time of the Pusan Perimeter,
Colonel William Quinn, ^who had served with the Central

Intelligence Group, was a member of the Task Force then
preparing to land at Inchon on 15 September 1950. C olonel
Quinn and the 0S0 (CIA Intelligence) Chief J [ planned

the placing of □CIA case officers on an island off Incho.
h.rhor to collect pre- invasion intelligence. The case

f ' ' i

officers used a simple control technique..

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The intelligence produced supported General MacArthur's
decision to proceed with the Inchon Landings despite active
opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, CIA made a
small contribution to the most brilliant tactical stroke of
the Korean War.

Armed Reconnaissance of North Korean Coast

In the late summer of 1950, an armed CIA- Korean recon-
naissance team began making regular night landings on the
enemy east coast. The team operating from a U.S. destroyer
took Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams, the Surgeon General
of the Far East Command, into an enemy fishing village at
night; outposted the area, made contact with the village
chiefs, and returned the Surgeon General to the destroyer.

The General's foray into the village was*to counter Communist
claims that the U.S. was engaged in germ warfare and earnpd
General Sams the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in
the night's operations.

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Arms and Munitions: In 1951, enemy weapons and ammuni-

tion were issued to CIA guerrillas from a captured weapons
dump near Pusan. CIA armed guerrillas with light U.S.
infantry weapons: M-l rifles, tommyguns, carbines , BARs ,

.30 caliber light machine guns, 2.36 rocket launchers
(bazookas) and no weapon heavier than the 81 mm mortar.

Support - A Two-Way Street: Sensible two-way support

arrangements evolved through necessity and cooperation.

In the tenth week of the war, CIA was given
by the Far East Air Force to drop agent teams along

the Manchurian-Soviet border of North Korea. In 1951 agents
of the Army Far East Command Liaison Group were dropped with
CIA parachutes when all military airborne materiel in the
theater was frozen for use by the 187th Parachute Infantry.

No reimbursement was required in either case. The uncon-
ventional warfare operators were "poor relations" compared to
the conventional forces; consequently, they helped each other
in every way they could.

The predecessor to the present CIA filler conveyor air
cargo drop system was developed by an Air Force officer
assigned to the Agency Mission in Korea. Concerned with the
time delays civilian parachute dispatch officers took to get
cargo out over the drop zone, he borrowed some roller con-
veyor rails from an Air Force storage warehouse and made an

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effective and faster exit mechanism. CIA provided small
gold bars to the Far East Air Force

(FEAF) for Escape and Evasion kits. CIA declined as un-
necessary a FEAF reimbursement offer. U.S. radios of that
day were too bulky and heavy for guerrilla warfare. CIA
contacted the electronics industry and had a smaller,

lighter radio placed in production. Sets Were given to the
Armed Forces for their agent operations.

Agent Authentication

A major problem was that of trying to keep up with North
Korean changes in document control. j

j In North Korea,

CIA and military agents collected travel control, identity,
and ration documents which were then sent for

reproduction. Another major source for authentication material
was the Advanced Allied Translator and Interpreter Section
in Korea. ^

Finances

The Mission finance officer from November 1951 to July
1952, recalls that the Agency was funded in cash in an
amount of approximately U.S. dollars per month or

annually. With few exceptions, funds were con-
verted to Korean currency ("won") through an Army Disbursing

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authority to do whatever was necessary to see that the
covert and clandestine activities of all American units in
Korea were coordinated. I li n November 1951

after exploratory discussions with the Acting CIA Repre-
sentative , FEC , G-^2 EUSAK, other CIA officers in

Korea, the Far East Air Force and the 7th Fleet, the Theater

G-2 section arbitrarily acted to achieve G-2's stated and

intended purposes. G-2 clearly understood General Walter

*

Bedell Smith's position that CIA being placed under the

Far East Theater Commander was predicated on Army assurance

it would turn back clandestine and covert activities to the

Agency as soon as combat ceased. "Peace talks" were resumed

at Panmunjom on 27 November 1951 and the "cease fire' line

was agreed upon. For the first time since the war began it

appeared that an end to the fighting was in sight. On 28

November 1951 a FECOM order created a new organization by

giving FEC/LD the euphonious short title: CCRAK.

FEC/LD, the Theater G-2 detachment in Korea, responded

by placing a sign in ten— inch letters in front of their

office in Seoul announcing FEC/LD was the American Headquarters

for "COVERT, CLANDESTINE, AND RELATED ACTIVITIES, KOREA."

19 /

Astounded CIA staffers in Korea appreciating the humor of
the situation, helped their old friend the FEC/LD Commander,
now the new Commander CCRAK, to improvise the euphemistic

title "Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Korea."

With the issuance of the 28 November FECOM order, the Chief,

CIA Mission Korea became Deputy Commander of CCRAK in
addition to his CIA duties. CIA personnel in Korea pitched
in and tried to make CCRAK work as they were much too busy
with operations to have the time or inclination to fight the
command problem. With MacArthur’s G-2 gone, the CIA Chiefs
while skeptically remembering that not long ago
General Willoughby put CIA activities under surveillance

I cautiously agreed not to fight "city hall."

The Effect of CCRAK

On 6 March 1952 the Acting Senior CIA Representative | |

reviewed CCRAK activities for CIA Headquarters. The
dispatch attached, described what it terms a shocking desire
for control — theater staff officers’ attempts to circumvent
the Acting Senior CIA Representative/FEC at theater level and
unwarranted attempts to gain operational information not
needed by a non-operating agency. The dispatch also said
CIA officers in Korea held the firm belieT' that General
Ridgway, the FE Commander; General Van Fleet, Commander
EUSAK; General Everest, FEAF Commander.; and Admiral Martin,
Commanding the 7th Fleet, were all of the opinion that CIA could
best render support to the Theater Commander by attempting to
carry out its own national missions rather than by becoming a

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low-level tactical organization. The long and detailed
dispatch is of special interest in the light of present
day CIA relations with the JCS/Special Assistant for Counter-
insurgency and Special Activities (JCS/SACSA) , the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) , and the increasing involvement of
CIA in joint coVert activities with the Armed Forces.

The effect of CCRAK's creation was stronger G-2 control
over CIA, weighting the Agency with demands for direct
tactical support of G-2, thereby proliferating CIA's long-
term strategic responsibilities with local low-level order-
of-battle type tasks. These tasks inevitably diverted the
small CIA Mission from its primary job of getting high-level

tactical operations exposed agents and operations not only
to the enemy but to the local population and to many United
Nations agencies as well.

The centralized coordinating mechanism adopted in Korea
was ill advised. As the Agency on-duty strength increased
after June 1951, more man-hours were devoted to lateral
liaison than had been previously possible. When CCRAK was
formalized in November 1951, CIA had good working relations

with all the senior U.S. military commanders in Korea.

Liaison was also maintained with their subordinate units
where there was a need for mutual cooperation, support, or
special services. Most important, a feeling of mutual trust
and understanding had grown up among the individuals of the
various subordinate units engaged in clandestine and covert
operations in Korea.

Additionally, the CCRAK organization with unquestioned
over-control of CIA activities as of June 1952 still had not
unraveled the more vexing problem of coordinating agent
activities. There were the problems of false confirmation of
reports caused by lateral contacts between Korean agents, of
fabricators, and of double agents. Penetrations of U.S. and
foreign intelligence services did not get the prompt damage
assessments required to bring them quickly under control. In
fairness to CCRAK officers, the CIA Mission Korea admittedly
complicated the agent coordinating issue by refusing to
reveal identities of sensitive agents. This was done because
CIA is required by law to protect its sources, and the
Korean Mission had been directed by its Washington Headquarters
to preserve its assets for the long haul regardless of the
outcome of the war.

The lack of coordination of agent activities was most
noticeable in the U.S. counterintelligence effort against the

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t

mammoth Communist covert action machine. Yet, G-2 EUSAK
would not permit the Eighth Army Counterintelligence Corps
to be placed under joint CCRAK coordination. Clearly,

CCRAK was sauce to cook the CIA goose. It was not intended
that the job should be divided up with the Armed Forces to
launch a combined counterintelligence offensive.

It is fruitless to speculate .on what might have been,
but a regrettable side effect of the control exercised by
CCRAK is that the Agency did not put its best foot forward
in Korea in the last year of the war. Quite frankly, with the
exception of a hard core cadre, green and untried case offi-
cers were substituted for qualified, experienced officers
because the latter were in short supply. By the fall of 1951,
CIA Headquarters recognized there were great opportunities
if more experienced CIA officers were in Korea. Accordingly,
three of the most competent senior clandestine services
officers in the Agency were selected: one to be full-time

ClA representative and Deputy of CCRAK, another as head of
CCRAK* s counterintelligence section and doubling as Chief of
CIA’s counterespionage staff, and the third as Chief of
foreign intelligence activities. When it became clear the
CCRAK coordination meant that the cease-fire restrictions on
tactical activities of the regular forces would also apply
to strategic, covert, and clandestine operations, the three

s E cVt E T

officers were reassigned elsewhere.

In 1952 CCRAK began to stifle new operations,
quently, CIA lost the covert action initiative in Korea to
the Communists. The earlier CIA concept of an aggressive
clandestine offensive, or at least covert counter-attack to
the north, never materialised. By June 1952 the handwriting on
the wall clearly pointed a return to a defensive covert and

clandestine position.

«-f n limited' war which caused more
So ends our memoirs of a limiteu

. + • ac Thp armistice talks bogged
than four million casualties. The armisri

down over the POW issue. Men continued to die, but it

became more a war of words than of guns. Stalemate fighting

along the 38th parallel battlefront ended a year later with

the Panmun j om cease-fire on 27 July 1953. At great price

. . . twenty million souls remained

communism was contained, ove

free, and the world gained time and experience. Is the
time well used by the West? What did the experience teach?

Secret War In Korea SECRET

Appendix 'v

\ -1067

AIR

6 March 1952

Chief, FE

Operational

Review of Combined Command Reconnaissance
Activities, Korea (CCRAK)*

Reference: WASH FG 29386

I. STATUS OF THE CIA MISSION KOREA, OCTOBER 1951
A. Mission

1 . In October 1951 the mission of the CIA Mission

Korea had been defined by Washington as the implementation of
NSC Directive 5 and NSC Directive 10/2 in Korea, | ~

Tne (JJLA Mission Korea was also directed to support 8th Army,
Korea 5th Air Force, and 7th U. S. Fleet Navy. The CIA Mis-
sion Korea was a joint Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) -
Office of Special Operations (OSO) Mission and was assigned
personnel from both offices.

2. There were in the CIA Mission Korea files many

National Intelligence Directives and Guides, as well as nu-
merous Essential Elements of Information. In existence was
the beginning of a good effort in Guerrilla Warfare in North-
east Korea and a splendid black Psychological Warfare Program
effected in cooperation with G-3 Psywar, EUSAK. An Evasion
and Escape Program was being carried out on an advisory basis
with the 8086th Army Unit, G-3 Section, EUSAK. North Korea
had been divided into two parts for purposes of Guerrilla
Warfare concentration: OPC having the eastern portion, and

the 8086th Army Unit having the western pdftion. There was
no geographical division established for psychological war-
fare. At that time the CIA Mission Korea did not have a
program in political, resistance, or economic warfare.

3. In October 1951 the staff of the CIA Mission
Korea was busily engaged and planning for a possible post-
armistice in which, it was believed, the CIA Mission Korea

*CCRAK - Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea:
Cover name for FEC/Unconventional Warfare Coordination Office
in Korea .

would bear sole responsibility for the accomplishment of covert
and clandestine missions in North Korea. The tentative plan
for a resistance program in North Korea had been made, and
annexes to that plan covering psychological, economic, guer-
rila, and resistance warfare were being prepared.

4. A long-range plan was being prepared for the ac-
complishment of our National Intelligence mission in the areas
of Mission responsibility. In October 1951, the penetration of
North Korean Communist Party, Army, M.S.S.,(The MGB of North
Korea) and governmental offices was well under way. A good
groundwork had been laid for the receipt of high-level infor-
mation from all of those offices, as is shown by the subse-
quent record achieved by those nets during the months of
November, December and January. (For instance, intelligence
production of the CIA Mission Korea increased by 1/3 during
December over the production of the previous month, and the
record for January was almost equally significant. Forty
percent of that production was military intelligence in direct
support of the Armed Forces of the United States in Korea, the
remaining sixty percent being divided between political, eco-
nomic, social, and counterespionage reporting of a more long-
range nature. In January, two specific reports covering the
entire Order of Battle of the NK and CCF armies in North
Korea were received.)

5. On the OPC side, contacts with the ROK Army and
with a militant Buddhist organization had been made and tenta-
tive plans were in process for the use of those organizations
in a vigorous resistance and guerrilla program.

6. Other intelligence organizations operating in

Korea: FEC/LD; Special Activities Unit, 5th Air Force; ROK

HID were operating low-level line crossing nets giving des-
criptive coverage of activities on the ground. Almost 100
percent of their reports were of the low-level type, the
major exception being the reporting of the EUSAK CIC which
interestingly enough has been excepted from the control of
CCRAK. The guerrilla warfare program of G-S^'EUSAK included
about 8,000 guerrillas on the west coast, but no safe base
had been established on the mainland of North Korea, and
that effort was almost entirely dependent upon island bases
lying off the west coast. This fact later proved disastrous.

7. Covert and clandestine activities in Korea were
coordinated in October 1951 by FEC/LD, which enjoyed a full
privilege of doing whatever the situation required to see that
these activities were coordinated.

B . Organization of Covert and Clandestine Activities in
Korea during October 1951

1. These activities, aS before stated, were under
the coordination of Col. Russell, Commanding Officer, FEC/LD,
who was under the command of Col. Blakeney, Commanding Officer
FEC/LG, G-2 Section, GHQ. In addition to the units mentioned
above, United States Army CIC Units were operating in Korea,
both in the field of Counterintelligence and in the gathering
of Positive Intelligence. The ROK Navy was engaged in the
collection of positive information under the supervision of
Commander Lousey, USN.

2. Fifth Air Force requirements were being met by
the Special Activities Unit under Mr. Donald Nicholls.

3. The tactical OB requirements of EUSAK were being
met by several units under the command of FEC/LD and by the
ROK HID. The CIA Mission Korea was attempting to accomplish
both its national requirements and its requirements in support
of armed forces in Korea. (For instance, during the month of
January 1952 the CIA Mission Korea furnished more reports in
support of 5th Air Force than did any other organization in
Korea . )

II. INTRODUCTION OF CCRAK PROPOSALS DURING OCTOBER 1951
A. Background

1. During the summer 1951, agreement was reached
between Walter Bedell Smith and officers within the Depart-
ment of the Army to place both covert and clandestine activi-
ties under CinCFE while actual combat continued in Korea. No
agreement was reached concerning the way CinCFE would exercise
that command authority.

2. On 18 October 1951, a draft paper was prepared
within G-2 Section, GHQ, subject: Organization of Covert,

Clandestine and Related Activities in the Far East Command.

(See Annex No. 3) This paper suggested an organization called
CCRAFEC, which would command these activities throughout the
Far East Command, including Korea. It was arrived at after
discussions among Central Intelligence Agency, G-2, GHQ and G-2,
EUSAK officers. Upon its receipt a study dated 21 October 1951
was made by the staff of the CIA Mission Korea. (See Annex
No. 2) A meeting was called in Seoul, Korea, to discuss that
draft paper on 21 and 22 October 1951. Also, on 21 October
1951, the Central I ntelligence Agency national position on
+ — — - ' 1 f r o m WASH-AH. (See Annex No 4)

this paper was sent

complete report of the Seoul conferences was prepared and
submitted to Washington. (See Annex No. 6)

SECEET

\

3. The Washington position, Central Intelligence
Agency, rests upon the following - Paragraph 2 of WASH 12391
states ;

"Assumed that Far East Command proposal is in part
outgrowth and within the framework of reference of Gen-
eral Willard G. Wyman series of conferences with Lt. Gen.
Hickey, Chief of Staff, FEC, and others, and is intended
to facilitate transfer of total responsibility fdr covert,
clandestine and related activities to Central Intelligence
Agency at early date. Guidance which follows hereinafter
based this premise. At this instant we must depend for
protection Central Intelligence Agency interest upon your
assurance of continued validity this assumption."

This basic premise was included in the final paper of t he Seoul
conferences as initialed by G-2 EUSAK, I I and

Colonel Blakeney for G-2, GHQ.

4. In addition to including that basic premise, the
Seoul conferees also initialed the following points made in
WASH 12391;

a. The organizational integrity of Army, Air,
Navy, and CIA units shall be maintained.

b. Army, Air, Navy, CIA units shall all be
placed simultaneously under CCRAK.

c. CIA channel is

to the CIA Mission Koreal CIA operations of high
sensitivity and/or with long-term characteristics
which extend through area into adjacent areas and
are not in direct support of EUSAK, shall be ex-
cepted from CCRAK control.

d. CCRAK is a joint staff under one command.

5. The Washington position was maintained and agreed
to by G-2 representatives.

6. Fifth Air Force was informed of the Seoul con-
ference paper and from that time on exchanged freely copies of
its attitude on this subject with CIA officers. Lt. Gen. Everest

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took the position in several messages to Gen. Weyland that the
only organization capable of accomplishing the American clan-
destine and covert mission was CIA, and that all other units
in Korea should be placed under it.

7. However, Lt. Gen. Everest was not approached on
this subject by G-2 Section, GHQ officers until after the Chief
of Staff, Lt. Gen. Hickey, GHQ had approved the order estab-
lishing CCRAK. Lt. Gen. Everest was furious because he had not
been consulted prior to the time the order was issued, and
more significantly, because G-2 officers pretended to him when
they first talked to him about the subject that the order was
not yet approved. The tactics adopted by officers of G-2
Section, GHQ, therefore, seemed to be to win command control
over CIA and then to present a fait accompli to Air Force and
Navy .

8. The basic order establishing CCRAK dated 28
November 1951 almost completely ignored the Seoul Agreement
and threw out almost all of the points insisted upon by CIA
in WASH 12391. The premise of our Washington position was
that assets in Korea be turned over to CIA at an early date -
obviously with an impending armistice in mind. The Washington
position was changed in the implementing order to read ’’gradual
transfer." (See Annex No. 7) The only Washington position re-
tained in the order was that CIA Mission Korea would retain or-
ganizational integrity. Sensitive and long-range operations
were not specifically excluded from the CCRAK Charter.

9 . This order was announced without the concurrence
and without the knowledge of | | Gen. Weyland and was in

serious disagreement with the basic position taken by CIA and
by Lt. Gen. Everest. It is believed that it was done without
the knowledge of Gen. Ridgway.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORDER ESTABLISHING CCRAK

A. Difference between CIA and G-2 Section, GHQ in Mission

Appreciation ~~ " ® ar ’

1. Throughout the negotiations CIA pledged its
cooperation to ; the notion that theater commanders must be
served during time of combat. However, OPC-OSO officers also
realized that they were enjoined by National Intelligence
Directives to collect information on many extremely important
intelligence targets in North Korea, f

| (For instance , the Mono zite Mines in North
Korea were a target of urgent priority.

SECRET

There were no Washington Directives In tnis xneaxer relieving
the CIA Mission Korea from its responsibility for procuring
high-level, strategic information, and the CIA Mission Korea
was the only hope in the area from October 1951 on, which
might warn of large-scale attacks .

2. While, on the other hand, the OPC Mission in
Korea enjoyed equally good avenues of approach into North Korea

The rugged mountainous terrain that crosses

offered an excellent

i Northeastern Korea , .

opportunity for the establishment oi a safe guerrilla base
The North Korean labor party was composed of many different
factions drawn from several places of the Far West. The
Party was still in the development stage known as the Father-
land Front stage. Entrance into the NKLP seemed relatively
easy and many North Korean boys were being recruited for
training in the use of Soviet aircraft and their maintenance.
The Army used by the Chinese Communists against the forces of
the United Nations was very largely composed of men who for-
merly were members of the Chinese Nationalist Army. People
of North Korea lost seventy percent of their rice, it was
reported, to the NKLP. In other words, the entire situation
was fluid from almost every point of view and the opportunity
might exist for the creation by clandestine means of a deep
political resistance movement against the Communists. These
opportunities still exist.

3, At the same time, the CIA Mission Korea also
bore a responsibility for supporting the Air Force, Army,
and Navy engaged in combat in Korea® We believe that it is
at this point where confusion exists concerning the mission of
CIA during times of combat, for as soon as negotiations began ,
concerning CCRAK, it became clear to CIA officers in this theater
that the appreciation of Army negotiators of the mission, trade-
craft, security devices, and potentialities of CIA was far dif-
ferent from the appreciation held by CIA oxiicers. More pre-
cisely, Army negotiators felt the CIA’s willingness to serve
the Theater Commander meant that CIA should now become J us t
another extension of the G-2 Section in Korea. They thought
of the CIA Mission Korea in terms of a collection agency for
tactical information and as a unit whose unconventional war-
fare program should be guerrillas used in close support of
EUSAK.

4. It must be remembered that the CIA Mission Korea
was not relieved of its national mission and, indeed, had made
fast strides towards its accomplishment during the very few '

SECRET

months of its organizational existence. CCRAK, therefore,
posed a great question for CIA in this theater: Did its

participation in CCRAK throw to the ground its national
mission?

5. It must be remembered that, later, the order
establishing CCRAK limited its functions to those activities
in direct support of armed forces in Korea. However, although
CCRAK’ s mission was limited to those activities in direct
support, there was no clarification of the question of how
much effort the CIA Mission Korea should make in CCRAK and how
much effort it should make in support of its national mission.

6. Here it must be frankly stated that CIA officers
in this theater firmly believed that they could best render
support to the Theater Commander by attempting to carry out its
national missions rather than becoming a low-level tactical
organization. And it must be stated in equally frank terms that
CIA officers felt that Gen. Ridgway, Gen. Van Fleet, Gen. Everest,
and Adm. Martin were of the same opinion; while, on the other
hand, the officers of G-2 EUSAK and G-2 GHQ were of a different
opinion. Both Gen. Ridgway and Gen. Van Fleet have said many
times that they required high-level information concerning the
intentions of the enemy and were content to accept tactical
intelligence as provided by their G-2 sections.

B. Definition of CCRAK Responsibilities

1. Because of the vagueness concerning the length

quoted in Annex No. 11, but here are its most salient points:

a. Armistice or no armistice, there is no
peace in the Far East, nor will there be in the
forseeable future. The Red Threat... is a con-
tinuing one.

b. To meet this threat, FEC control... is
essential.

c. CCRAK should remain unchanged until peace
is assured in Korea. Cessation of hostilities is
no guarantee that armed warfare will not be resumed.

d. Until all troops, CCF and UN, have with-
drawn, CCRAK will remain.

2. A serious blunder, we feel, was made at this
time by G-2, GHQ, in having the order establishing CCRAK

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published before the Air Force had'the opportunity to go over
the final draft. In response to queries from Gen. Everest and
Gen. Weyland on this subject, Lt. Gen. Doyle 0. Hickey, Chief
of Staff, replied that the Air Force's desires would receive
thorough consideration prior to implementing the detailed opera-
tional and functional plan with CCRAK. Inasmuch as the Fifth .

Air Force had not been consulted prior to the order establishing
CCRAK, Gen. Everest did not feel that the Army was acting in
this case in good faith. (See Annex No. 9)

3 # I I a paper defining the

responsibility and functions of CCRAK was sent from G-2, QM Q,
to Korea. (See Annex No. 12) This paper continued the G-2
Section, GHQ attitude of thinking of CCRAK as a command orga-
nization over the CIA Mission Korea. Although the basic
Charter of CCRAK had been published without including the pro-
visions initialed in the Seoul Conference paper, and without
any of the CIA points established in WASH-12391 except for
unit integrity, this implementation draft order now attempted
to do away with the only Washington provision left in the
Charter - unit integrity. We recommend strongly that you
study this paper thoroughly because it is the best statement
we know of the attitude of G-2 Section officers concerning
the way they believe covert and clandestine activities should
be organized in times of comba,t. It is a position exemplified,
it is said, by Gen. McClure and others of that school of thought.
The principle upon which the paper rests is; Complete Command
Control. In effect it does away with CIA and places CIA offi-
cers and operations completely under the control of G-2 offi-
cers. For instance, this paper would give Chief, CCRAK super-
visory authority over the expenditure of funds allocated to
units under his control. It would give Chief, CCRAK authority
over all housekeeping and attendant duties as the situation
may require . It would not permit the hiring of any indigenous
person without the approval from G— 2. It would give Chief,

CCRAK, authority to conduct intelligence operations for related
activities within Korea or originating in Korea and directed
into contiguous areas.

4. Note well that this paper would elevate G-2
Section into a position where it could direct any organiza-
tion to carry out the national missions of CIA, and It ig-
nores the basic CCRAK order's limiting clause; CCRAK is in
direct support of Armed Forces in Korea.

5. This paper was not published

land, so far, no implementation order exists
defining the duties of Chief, CCRAK. However, the basic atti-
tude embodied in that paper still remains and has been expressed
by the present Chief, CCRAK when he said that CCRAK does possess
authority to carry out long|range missions beyond the Yalu and

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into China. This stand is in flat contradiction to the CCRAK
Charter.

ing the draft
trol

^reported his attitude concern-

"It indicates a shocking desire for con-

order .

■ was also told by the G-2 GHQ that he did not

have knowledge of the implementation draft order. | at

that time also reported to G-2 GHQ his feelings that CCRAK
must remain within its Charter as a staff in direct support
of armed forces in Korea, and that National Intelligence
Directives should remain within CIA. (See Annex No. 13)

7 . This implementation order also began a series of
attempts by officers within G-2 GHQ to circumvent | by

sending orders directly to CCRAK whose contents involved the
CIA Mission Korea. That practice has continued until the
date of this writing, 5 March 1952. When this circumvention
is pointed out to these officers they admit- their error, but
persist in the practice.

8. The next move made by G-2 GHQ to define the
duties of Chief, CCRAK involved a CE program for Korea which
was embodied in a paper written by Col. Blakeney, Commanding
Officer, FEC/LG. (See Annex No. 15) This draft again cir-
cumvented | | It included an attempt by G-2 ; ,GHQ to enter

the field oi controlled agents for deception purposes. It
also entered the field of monitoring clandestine enemy com-
munications. The reply to this paper (See Annex No. 15) was
prepared by Col. Ives pointing out to Col. Blakeney that the
CIA Mission Korea would carry forward controlled agent acti-
vities into enemy territory. After consultation with G-2,
EUSAK, he reserved controlled agent operations in South Korea
to the CXC. He reserved the monitoring of enemy communications
in Korea to ASAPAC. No implementation order in this field
was issued, but the attitude of G— 2. officers remains and will
be carried out in the field.

9. During a meeting of of fleers ifirom all units
within CCRAK on 4 February 1952, Col. Ives, Chief, CCRAK
stated that CCRAK now had far-ranging plans beyond the Yalu,
and that FEC/LB had been authorized to go deep by G-2 GHQ.

Other officers from other units told Col. Ives that they felt
incapable of carrying out that mission which, they felt, should
be reserved for the CIA Mission Korea. It. Col. George Budway,
USAF, Deputy for Air, CCRAK, told Col. Ives that CCRAK would

be "going in way over its head,” for CCRAK by Charter was limited
to direct support of armed forces. CIA officers told Col. Ives
tha.t in their opinion CCRAK should remain within its Charter.

10. From the foregoing it should be clear that
although CCRAK was established for direct support of armed

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forces, it now is adopting a mission comparable to - if not
the same as - CIA. G-2 officers have clearly indicated their
desire to take over CIA and its mission.

11. In implementing CCRAK Charter, G-2 officers have
displayed little concern over the security of American sensitive
operations. For instance, G-2 EUSAK has asked Chief CCRAK to
give him a list of all operational safehouses in the city of
Seoul, including the names of all occupants, their duties, and
operations that require them to occupy safehouses. G-2, EUSAK
explains that this housing was commandeered by the Army in vio-
lation of its own regulations. It is believed that this is
persiflage inasmuch as a state of semi— martial law exists in
Seoul and no house can be occupied without Army approval. In
a meeting with the Chief/CIA Mission Seoul Station Korea, an
officer of CCRAK stated that after discussing this matter with
Col. Van Natta, G-2 EUSAK, he was convinced that Col. Van Natta
did not need to know that operational information, but merely
wanted to know these operational facts. The effect of releasing
that information to another American agency would be a severe
security risk, and rather than conform, the CIA Mission Korea
would have to protect its agents by moving them from Seoul.

12. Another unwarranted attempt to gain operational
information that is not required by a non-operating agency
occurred on 4 March 1952 when G-2 GHQ requested a weekly state-
ment from the CIA Mission Korea concerning the number of agents
infiltrated and exfiltrated, number of reports in and out,
number of reports received from agent radio circuits. It was
explained that G-2 GHQ desired this operational information for
briefing purposes. Again the security risks involved in this
unusual request are apparent, as well as the obviou s attempt
to gain further control and possible elimination of _
monthly briefing of Ridgway. Direct access to and periodic
briefing of commanding generals are essential if CIA accomplish-
ments are to be known to those gentlemen, as witness Gen. Van
Fleet's negative reply to the question: Had he ever received

anything credited to CIA.

IV. PRESENT STATUS OF CCRAK

A. Organization of CCRAK

1. CCRAK is now headed by Col. Washington M. Ives,
who was Deputy for Administration, G-2 GHQ. Col. Ives is a
fine gentlemen with no intelligence training ot operational
background who states that he is in a very difficult position
because he does not know the business. Although under severe
pressure from Col. Blakeney and Col. Bratton in G-2 GHQ, Col.
Ives has recognized that if the covert and clandestine missions
were to be performed, they must be done under the CIA Mission

10

RET

Korea officers. When given a difficult operational assignment,
Col. Ives invariably has turned to the CIA Mission Korea offi-
cers for guidance. The reasons for this practice are obvious,
but their time-consuming effects upon the CIA’s activities have
been great. That time could very well have been spent in get-
ting on with the CIA Mission Korea Mission, and the effects of
CCRAK have meant a duplication of efforts by senior officers in
the CIA Mission Korea.

2. The Deputy, CCRAK is the Chief /CIA Mission Korea,
who already has been under severe pressure accomplishing his own
duties. Inasmuch as the desires of General Ridgway, General
Van Fleet, General Everest, and Admiral Briscoe can only be met
through long-range sensitive operations, the Chief /CIA Mission
Korea must spend time within CCRAK and then go back to his own
Mission where the work must be performed.

3. Chief, Seoul Station CIA Mission Korea has acted
as Operations Officer for Chief, CCRAK and has reported many
times that the only organization capable of providing what
Senior Commanders desire is the CIA Mission Korea, and that
invariably after long discussions with CCRAK, he must return
to his own unit to plan and execute intelligence requirements.

4.

of the CIA Mission Korea, was

assigned as the CE Officer to CCRAK, and is the third officer
committed to CCRAK by the CIA Mission Korea.

5. Lt. Col. George M. Budway, USAF, was assigned by
5th Air Force to CCRAK as Deputy for Air. Col. Budway has
stated many times that there was no reason for the existence
of CCRAK in the first place, and that the G-2’s authority to
coordinate, which it possessed prior to CCRAK, was all that the
field required. He has stated to Col. Ives his fears that
CCRAK was attempting to expand its Charter and that it was
draining resources from the CIA Mission Korea which more
appropriately should be employed in the accomplishment of the
^A^ission-i, At present, Col. Budway is the only officer com-
mitted to CCRAK by the Air Force.

6. Staff Sections of CCRAK are broken down into S-2,
S-3 Sections and a combined S-l and 8-4 Section. In a meeting
of all of these Staff Sections during February 1952, it was
agreed that representatives of operating units should meet
once a week in order to discuss which unit could carry out any
given requirement. It was clear to all present that the only
way intelligent planning could be done was by those officers who
were most familiar with operating indigenous personnel. This in
dicates the feelings of those officers who know the organization
best concerning the way the covert and clandestine job should be

done, and indicates the fact that coordination - not control -
is required.

B. Security Within CCRAK

i Tt has been shown time and time again that persons
who have not been ttaS in clandestine tradecraft cannot safe-
ly be entrusted with total information concerning CIA and its

operations. Army Officers assigned t o CCRAK have repeatedly

violated basic tradecraft pra ctices. — /

I Also, at a cocktail

T h officers of FKC/LD, the nam es of operating orga-

nizations within CIA were openly announced by an
present . Wounded guerrillas have been fought to CCRAK Head
quarters, and a captured enemy agent was ^‘ v ®J e 1 “ r J v ^ e ? n
through Seoul to that Headquarters. Koreans are J7_

in a truck with FEC/LD bumper markings to K-16 Air-

placed upon them and where they are
openly boarded upon a USAF aircraft. The association of CIA
rc w with the CCRAK organization can blow them for all
Ume? and their usefulness to CIA

penetration^o^that^rganization a rather simple operation and
CIA must appreciate that fact.

Command Channels

to the CIA Mission

1. Command channels | i

Korea are openly circumvented, presumably in an effort to
bring all of the CIA Mission Korea's operations under the

command of G-2 officers.

2 The command channel from Chief, CCRAK, is by
Charter directly to ClnCFE. akLe^^antog

« ^!%his is one realJn ^ ^al Eidg^y
has not known the true nature of the effect of his aecisi
place CIA in Korea under G-2, GHQ.

D. Morale Within The CIA Mi ssion Korea
Korea are S

aw

suit flowing from the institution of CCRAK. They cann

12

understand why command was given to an outfit with tactical
line-crossing operations which is incapable of doing the real
job. They have been proud of the fact that General Van Fleet
endorsed their approach when he said on 2 March 1952, ”1 am

glad to see that you are concentrating on your long-range
strategic mission and leaving tactical OB collection to the
G-2. That type of information can best be obtained by contin-
uous pressure along the front." In December 1951 Admiral
Perry, Carrier Task Force 77, stated, "Of the seemingly
hundreds of U. S. Intelligence operations in Korea, the CIA
Mission Korea has consistently provided us the most reliable
and timely information of any organization here." Lt. Gen.
Everest, Commanding General, 5th Air Force, has written a
letter of commendation for the CIA Mission Korea praising its
contribution to his mission, and he has suggested that Far
East Air Force do the same. In fact, General Everest has
offered us his S. A. U. "bag and baggage," and has repeatedly
urged that CIA stand on its own feet and perform the coordi-
nation function in Korea. At the same time, G-2 EUSAK, has
publicly stated upon many occasions during the last month that
the CIA Mission Korea work has been of little or no value to
him. This anomaly is difficult for the CIA Mission Korea to
understand. Perhaps a statement made by Col. Ives to Lt. Col.
Budway in February 1952 sheds light. Col. Ives stated that
G-2 EUSAK, Col. Van Natta, desired to control CCRAK and its
organizations .

E. CCRAK *s Mission as Defined by G-2, GHQ

1. G-2, GHQ officers are moving far afield from the
original agreement initialed in Seoul on 22 October 1951. After
initialing that agreement they caused to be published a Charter
for CCRAK which established the principle of command control
over the CIA Mission Korea, ignoring almost all of the basic
points required in WASH 12391. Only the principle of unit
integrity remained after that basic order, and subsequent
events have repeatedly shown that G-2 officers will move
beyond that last restriction.

2. Col. Ives, Chief, CCRAK has indicated that he
has been privately authorized to direct operations outside of
Korea .

3. In addition to the above, the G-2 GHQ has written
that his domination over the CIA Mission Korea will continue
until all foreign troops have been removed from Korea, and
until the threat of war no longer exists.

v. recommendations

A. Status

1 Continuation of the present situation of CIA

.... ™ lead to serious ramifications in our relation

within CCRAK ^an .. clear that officers within

T V' SS'wUl "ip her w^daspledged to CM nor does

2S Sp reserve* n££ rtil have to continue to bring

to Si attention of General Kldgway breaches of ^eement by
officers under his command, uur , . h a i„

is Y now clear that officers may well cause a rift.

2 Our present close association with officers of
G-2 GHQ leads to. the waste of many man-hours, which could
more profitably be spent upon CIA matters.

o Acceptance of the present and continuing diver-
gencies of i-2 off£ rill lead to a loss of organizational
and operational CIA integrity.

4. It now seems apparent that G-2 methods in Korea
will be extended throughout the Far East Command.

5 . Once given a foot in the door, G-2 officers have

Landes S£ of the united States Once having done

s-lm:

in the world.

6. Therefore, it is recommended that:

a. The CIA Mission Korea be withdrawn from
CCRAK, placed on its own feet, and^directed to
continue the attack upon the enemy.

K , | be removed from

G-2, GHQ staff supervisory control and established
lmon a similar footing with the Department of State,
keeping General Ridgway fully informed where appropriate.

Senior CIA Representative
Far East Command

S*